Forgotten Kurdistan

What is being done to the people of Kurdistan?

In the modern international order, few people embody the contradictions of international law and global politics as notably as the Kurds. With an estimated population of over 30 million, they constitute the largest stateless nation in the world. Since 1923, they have been systematically denied statehood, political recognition, and, in many cases, the most basic human rights. Their history of the modern Middle East is not one of absence but of deliberate erasure.

It is important to note that the fate of the Kurds was sealed not by war but by diplomacy. Indeed, after WWI, the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) acknowledged the possibility of a Kurdish autonomous region and even independence. However, this promise was abandoned with the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), which established the borders of modern-day Turkey and made no mention of the Kurds. Unlike others, Kurds were not recognized as a protected minority under international law.

Lausanne fragmented Kurdistan across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, turning Kurds into a minority overnight. This decision was made without consent, representation, or legal safeguards. This decision violated the emerging principle of self-determination, later enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter and Article 1 of both the ICCPR and ICESCR.

Bakur

From the founding of the Turkish Republic, the state pursued a policy of forced assimilation. Kurds were officially described as “Mountain Turks,” their language banned in public life, education, and media for decades. Let’s dig a bit deeper!

Atatürk is the founder of the Turkish Republic and is widely celebrated for modernizing Turkey and dismantling the Ottoman Empire’s religious foundations. However, this modernization project came at a high cost for non-Turkish peoples and, more importantly, the Kurds. His vision of the new republic was based on a unitary, secular, and ethnically Turkish nation-state. Unlike the Empire, which had allowed limited pluralism through the millet system, the republic rejected ethnic diversity as a threat to national unity. In this framework, Kurdish identity was not merely ignored; it was totally denied.

He denied the Kurdish existence —> “Mountain Turks.”
Ban on the Kurdish language
Law on the Maintenance of Order (1925)
Suppression of Kurdish Uprisings (Sheikh Said Rebellion or Dersim Massacre).

This approach to the Kurdish question did not end with his death in 1938. His ideology, known as Kemalism, was institutionalized as the foundational doctrine of the Turkish state.

More recently, Erdogan initially distanced himself from strict Kemalism, notably during peace talks with Kurdish representatives (2013-2015); the fundamental framework remains unchanged. However, today, Kurds in Turkey technically have the right to vote and run for office. But in practice, Kurdish political representation is systematically undermined. The Kurdish language is no longer outright banned, but it is severely restricted. But most importantly, the Turkish state continues to frame the Kurdish “issue” as a counterterrorism problem, as the state is fighting the PKK and its branch not only in the country but in Syria and Iraq. However, there are no meaningful peace negotiations between the Turkish and Kurdish representatives as of today (even if there was a process initiated at the end of 2024 and the call of Öcalan). While armed conflict levels fluctuate, the political roots of the Kurdish question remain unaddressed.

Rojava

Rojava, officially known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), emerged during the Syrian civil war after 2012, when the Assad regime withdrew from Kurdish-majority areas. Unlike traditional nationalist projects, Rojava developed a system inspired by democratic confederalism, emphasizing:

Local self-governance
Gender equality
Ethnic and religious pluralism
Secularism.

Now that the term Rojava is explained. Let’s understand their claim and the situation of Kurds in Syria!

In Syria, tens of thousands of Kurds were stripped of citizenship in 1962, rendering them stateless in their own homeland. The Kurdish language and political organization were banned for decades. This happened during the special census in the al-Hasakah province, where, arbitrarily, the Syrian government had stripped approximately 120,000 Kurds of Syrian citizenship. Their descendants (around 300,000 people) remained stateless for decades. As a result, stateless Kurds could not vote or own property, they were denied higher education and public employment, or they had no access to passports or legal mobility.

Later on, the Syrian Ba’ath regime pursued an explicit policy of Arabization in Kurdish regions, through the so-called “Arab-Belt” project in the 1970s:

Kurdish villages were destroyed or renamed
Arab settlers were moved to Kurdish areas
Kurdish language education was banned
Kurdish political parties were illegal.

Besides this, public celebration of Newroz (Kurdish New Year) was often violently suppressed, and Kurdish cultural expression was criminalized.

Picture – Newroz celebration at Akrê, Kurdistan

When the Syrian uprising began in 2011 in Deraa, Kurds initially adopted a cautious stance, shaped by decades of repression from Damascus and distrust of Arab opposition groups that often refused to recognize Kurdish rights. As the regime forces withdrew from Kurdish-majority areas in 2012, Kurdish actors filled the vacuum, leading to the emergence of Rojava. While Bashar al-Assad restored citizenship to some stateless Kurds in 2011, this was partial, politically motivated (to stay in power), and he did not dismantle Arabization or centralized control (in 2026, Ahmed al-Sharaa is doing the same in recognizing Kurdish rights to legitimize his power). It is also very important to know that during this uprising that became a civil war, they had to worry about another enemy: ISIS.

For Syrian Kurds, ISIS was not just another armed actor: the group was an existential enemy. ISIS ideology explicitly labeled Kurds (and more specifically, Yazidis) as:

Apostates
Legitimate targets for extermination.

This idea led the terrorist group to attempt to annihilate the city of Kobane from 2014 to 2015, and they genocided the Yazidi in Sinjar in 2014 (mass killings, sexual slavery, forced conversions…). This crime was perpetrated against Yazidi Kurds from Syria and Iraq during the establishment of ISIS caliphate. These crimes meet the legal definition of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention.

During the caliphate, the YPG/YPJ and later the SDF became the primary ground force deafeating ISIS in Syria with decisive role in Kobane, Manbij, Raqqa, and Baghouz. Without Kurdish-led forces ISIS would likely still control large parts of Syria and Iraq. Yet despite this Kurdish forces were excluded from most diplomatic processes and political recognition never followed military sacrifice.

As of January 2026, the Kurdish-led administration in northeast Syria (Rojava) faces an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. Syrian government forces have advanced into Kurdish-held cities such as Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah, effectively ending the semi-autonomous governance that Kurds have maintained since 2012. Damascus has offered a political integration deal, demanding that Kurdish civil institutions and security forces submit to central control, while Kurdish leaders resist, fearing the loss of self-rule. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have withdrawn from key ISIS detention facilities, including the al-Hol camp, transferring thousands of detainees to Iraq, while ISIS persists as an insurgent threat. Civilians are caught in the crossfire: thousands have been displaced, infrastructure has been damaged, and humanitarian access remains limited. At the same time, international support has shifted, with the U.S. signaling the end of backing for Kurdish autonomy and Turkey continuing to oppose Kurdish self-rule along its border. The situation underscores the fragility of Kurdish political and cultural rights in Syria, highlighting the intersection of regional power struggles, ongoing security threats, and the Kurdish struggle for recognition. Images have demonstrated that the Kurds are being once more vicitims of state repression, cultural repression, and inhumane acts of violence by ISIS fighters.

Bashur

The Kurds in Iraq have long occupied a distinct political space compared with their counterparts in Turkey, Syria, and Iran. As a matter of fact, they enjoy formal autonomy, constitutional recognition, and their own regional government. This unique status stemmed from decades of struggle and state collapse, finally enshrined in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, which recognized the Kurdistan Region as a semi‑autonomous federal entity with its own parliament, executive, and security forces (Peshmerga). They can:

Regional governance
Control over local police and Peshmerga forces
Cultural and linguistic rights
Clauses in the Iraqi Constitution affirming territorial and administrative rights.

Even if they possess one of the most politically advanced Kurdish frameworks, it has been undermined by ongoing disputes with Baghdad. This reached a climax point in 2017 when the Kurds voted in favor of independence. They were isolated, repressed, and abandoned by the West. Claimed to be unconstitutional, the Iraqi government refused to recognize the results and justified its action towards Kirkuk, oil, and economic sanctions in its Kurdish region. As a result, Kurds had to abandon their dream of independence to keep their autonomy from Baghdad.

However to arrive at this state of autonomy, it is important to understand their struggle for recognition.

The Kurds in Iraq have long been a rare exception among the Kurdish regions: following decades of brutal repression and genocide under Saddam Hussein, including chemical attacks on Halabja in 1988 and forced displacement during the Al-Anfal campaign, Iraqi Kurds achieved formal autonomy in the 1990s and constitutionally in 2005.

What is Anfal?

The Anfal campaign was a series of genocidal operations conducted by Saddam Hussein’s regime in northern Iraq between 1986 and 1989, targeting the Kurdish population. The name “Anfal” comes from the 8th sura (chapter) of the Quran, which the Iraqi regime co-opted as propaganda, framing the operations as a religiously sanctioned military effort. The campaign was explicitly aimed at destroying Kurdish resistance and depopulating Kurdish regions, particularly those that supported the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Key components included:

Mass killings: It is estimated that 50,000–182,000 Kurds were executed, including men, women, and children.
Chemical attacks: Notably the Halabja chemical attack in March 1988 killed around 5,000 civilians and injured thousands more. Mustard gas and nerve agents were used against civilian populations.
Forced displacement and village destruction: Over 4,000 villages were destroyed, leaving hundreds of thousands homeless. People were forced into concentration-style camps under dire conditions.
Cultural and social suppression: Kurdish language and political organization were targeted, attempting to erase Kurdish identity.

As a result Kurds and Western supports established the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), with their own parliament, security forces (Peshmerga), and significant cultural and linguistic rights around 1991. Yet, even in Iraq, the Kurdish struggle is far from over. Autonomy has never been complete or uncontested. Baghdad often challenges the KRG on:

Budget allocations and oil revenue sharing, creating chronic financial crises in the Kurdish region.
Control of disputed territories like Kirkuk, Sinjar, and Khanaqin, which Kurds consider historically part of Kurdistan. Baghdad has repeatedly attempted to assert authority over these areas, leading to clashes and political deadlock.
Judicial rulings and federal laws that erode Kurdish decision-making, undermining their constitutional guarantees.

Internally, the Kurdish political landscape is fragmented between dominant parties — the KDP and PUK — and this has weakened their ability to negotiate and defend autonomy. Regional geopolitics adds further pressure: Turkey monitors Kurdish politics closely due to PKK concerns, Iran maintains influence via Baghdad, and the United States’ strategic interests have shifted over time, leaving Kurds often isolated. The fight against ISIS further illustrates the Kurdish struggle: Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga were central in defending territory and combating the extremist group, yet responsibility for detainees and security increasingly shifted to Baghdad, limiting Kurdish control over the very regions they helped secure.

Despite decades of resistance, the Kurdish people in Iraq still struggle to fully realize their rights — their autonomy is fragile, contested, and dependent on a delicate balance between local cohesion, federal recognition, and regional power dynamics. Their struggle is thus part of the broader Kurdish narrative: a people fighting for recognition, political space, and security, even where legal frameworks ostensibly support them.

Rojhelat

Kurds in Iran, concentrated mainly in the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, and Ilam, have endured decades of systemic repression, marginalization, and denial of their cultural and political rights. Under the Pahlavi monarchy, the Iranian state pursued forced assimilation policies, suppressing Kurdish language, culture, and political organization. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy were violently crushed. Attempts by Kurdish groups, including the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) and Komala, to establish local councils and self-rule were met with overwhelming military force, resulting in thousands of deaths, mass imprisonment, and waves of refugees fleeing to Iraq and elsewhere. Today, Kurdish life in Iran remains tightly controlled. Kurdish activists, journalists, and political figures are frequently arrested on charges of “acting against national security” or alleged links to separatist movements. Kurdish language and culture are permitted in limited private or cultural contexts but remain largely absent from formal education and public media, reinforcing a broader pattern of cultural marginalization. Economically, Kurdish-majority provinces suffer chronic underdevelopment, with limited infrastructure, high unemployment, and minimal state investment, leaving communities trapped in persistent inequality.

The Iranian government frames Kurdish activism as a security threat, and cross-border operations by Kurdish groups from Iraqi Kurdistan provoke regular military raids by the Revolutionary Guard Corps, often displacing civilians and causing casualties. Despite these pressures, Kurds continue to resist through political activism, cultural preservation, and, in some border areas, armed struggle. These actions, however, are criminalized and punished harshly, highlighting the persistent gap between Iran’s constitutional and international obligations and the lived reality of its Kurdish population. Under international law, the situation of Iranian Kurds raises serious human rights concerns. Treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantee minority groups the right to maintain their language, culture, and political expression. In practice, these rights are curtailed, and the state’s security apparatus enforces restrictions on assembly, speech, and political organization. Economic marginalization further violates social and economic rights, demonstrating that the Kurdish struggle in Iran is as much about survival and dignity as it is about politics.

The story of Kurds in Iran is one of perseverance under relentless state pressure. It is part of the broader narrative of a people whose demands for recognition, self-expression, and basic human rights have been systematically ignored or suppressed for nearly a century. In Iranian Kurdistan, as in the other parts of Kurdistan, the struggle continues, largely invisible to the outside world, reinforcing the theme of a “Forgotten Kurdistan” where the fight for identity and justice remains unfinished.

Pictures:

Forgotten Kurdistan